Geopolitical, security and territorial calculations aside, Vladimir Putin’s unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine was, above all, a gamble; the kind of adventurism undertaken by a mind too long unfettered by absolute power and too certain of its choice architecture. If, as seems likely, Putin is defeated, what comes next? Veteran international political player and strategist Robin Sears games out the possibilities.

Robin V. Sears

One of the 20th century’s wisest observers on Russia, George Kennan, concluded that the deeply paranoid, mid-century Soviet regime could not be prevented from invading its neighbours, it could only “be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.”

Kennan, whose legacy includes the occasion eccentricity, was opposed to the creation of NATO, and called its expansion in 1998 a “strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions,” because he thought it would re-orient a Russia then undergoing democratic reform back toward a Cold War, expansionist mentality. In his writing, he sketched the challenges faced by neighbours and the world when the most imperious of Russia’s czars were on the rampage. Kennan died in 2005, but it would have been fascinating to hear his views on how to manage the current, crazed czar.

Author of the famous “Long Telegram” to the State Department from his post as deputy chief of mission in Moscow and the subsequent “X Article” published anonymously in Foreign Affairs that outlined his containment strategy, Kennan had lived and travelled widely in Russia. He admired and respected the Russian people, but was appalled at the viciousness and brutality to which their governors had subjected them for centuries. 

By the volatile early days of the Cold War, he was ambassador in Moscow, trying to transition from wartime allies to managing an increasingly threatening enemy. In a magnificent two-volume memoir for which he won the Pulitzer Prize, he returns again and again to the mystery of the violence and cruelty of Russian leaders, and their constant harassment of their neighbours. 

Kennan cites a conversation with a Russian official whose identity he does not reveal (‘Memoirs’, Vol. 1, Ch. 8) “Here,” the official said, “we have to have a dictatorship. Left to themselves, our people would know no measure. They have no restraints.” Kennan replies he will not judge their domestic system, but warns his friend that if they continue to be obsessed with espionage, meddling in other countries affairs, and sending generation after generation of “embittered and insulted diplomats” around the world, they would have to live with the consequences.

As Kennan gets up leave, the official says, “We are being very successful these days. The more successful we are, the less we care about foreign opinion. This is something you should bear in mind about the Russian. The better things go for him, the more arrogant he is. That applies to all of us, in the government and out. It is only when we are having hard sledding that we are meek and mild and conciliatory. When we are successful, keep out of our way.” Re-reading it more than seven decades after the fact, one could almost imagine Putin delivering these threatening remarks to a foreign leader in a private meeting. Clearly, Putin believed, until a few weeks ago, in his own success and what he had achieved in Russia over his two decades of dictatorship. 

An equally wise 21st century Russia watcher, former Polish prime minister and European Council president Donald Tusk, admonished those in recent years who did not see the strategic threat posed by Putin. Tusk assumed his EU office just after Putin’s first invasion of Ukraine. 

In a stern inaugural address he called on the EU to “stand up to its enemies”, and to support “those in the neighbourhood who share our values.” He was widely reprimanded across the West for this thinly veiled denunciation of Putin. As he was leaving five years later, he commented soberly that those who did not see the parallels between the early decades of the 20th century and the rising dangers today, were simply not paying attention. 

In a tweet at the end of March this year, Tusk whacked Germany for its wobbles on military support for Ukraine. He said, “ …shouldn’t the memory of the Nazi genocide make you take the lead in helping Ukraine? This is your political and moral obligation.” He then rounded on the EU itself saying: “Putin is preparing a decisive offensive. Europe must support Ukraine with all the means at its disposal. NOW! Otherwise another town may become Bucha.”

It is already a cliché to acknowledge that the world changed at 4:00 am local time on February 24. Some would argue it has changed more fundamentally than on the chill November night in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell. Russia has revealed once again its willingness to use force to achieve its aims. It must, once again, be taught a lesson about how unacceptable that is to the international community.

The continuing hand-wringing about “provoking Putin,” on the part of a stunning list of international policy gurus — including, bizarrely, Henry Kissinger — who are today’s appeasement advocates is embarrassing to behold. But the West appears to have come to realize that Putin must be defeated. He cannot be trusted to honour any ceasefire, pledge to withdraw or agreement to stop murdering thousands of civilians. As Canada’s UN ambassador, Bob Rae, put it icily, “How do you know when Putin is lying? His lips are moving.”

So, however many more bloody weeks or months it may take, Ukraine will not permit any Russian troops on its soil, nor cede an inch of its territory. President Zelenskyi and company have been brilliant in taking their case to the people of nearly every advanced democracy. Addressing entire nations through televised speeches to their national parliaments, they have firmed the spines of national leaders. Ukraine’s incredible determination and courage has meant they are increasingly being seen as heroes defending common values in the minds of voters in democracies around the world. It would be very unwise of any leader to advocate an early deal with Putin as more than a temporary relief for humanitarian reasons. 

Putin’s defeat seems increasingly likely so long as the West does not flinch in maintaining its supply of advanced weapons to Ukraine. The role of real-time battlefield intelligence provided by NATO, though not disclosed or admitted publicly, is an unspoken tactical advantage.

Putin’s arrogance — and his lack of any combat or military planning experience — led him to dismiss the conventional rule that a successful land invasion requires at least three times the numbers of defenders. His invaders were smaller in number than the combined defence forces, Defence of a homeland is also a force multiplier, especially against a poorly motivated invasion force significantly made up of conscripts with less than a year’s training. 

Perhaps the gravest challenge Putin now faces is that the West is invested in his defeat, even removal. A painful anniversary will pass without even major gains let alone triumph for Putin. May 9 is the annual celebration of Russia’s victory in what they know as the Great Patriotic War. The Second World War took more than 20 million Russian lives, by far the greatest number of any nation, and left a wound that Russians carry even now. Those watching the parade of military power past the Kremlin might well be reflecting on how many more dead Putin’s war will add.

So, what is to be done to secure, once more, a peace in Europe?

First, we need to start with a clean sheet of paper about security needs and the policies and structures to meet them. The NATO vs. non-NATO divide cannot hold any longer. Nations such as Finland, Austria, and Moldova are understandably reflecting on how to best defend themselves against a Russia with a renewed appetite for a neighbour’s territory. 

Second, we need to erase some of the policy red lines that have framed NATO and EU thinking since 1991. Taking care not to provoke Putin or treating Russia as a reliable treaty partner so long as he is in power is no longer possible, probably for several years.

The EU may move at a snail’s pace on membership decisions, but announcing a start with a first round of talks, in Kyiv, as soon as is possible is entirely doable. Europe could also explore short-term economic and political supports for Ukraine, such as shared humanitarian, educational, and economic development programs. It could also extend observer status to key institutions and invitations to major EU events. Each step designed to quickly and firmly convey to Russia that Ukraine is part of Europe and is on a path to full membership in the EU.

To hold the peace, when it is achieved, will probably require for some years, permanently stationed NATO and other allied forces at key points along Russia’s entire western perimeter. Tempting Putin to take Moldova, from his base in Transnistria, for example, by not granting Moldova visible protection, merely exposes Romania to greater risk. 

Nations such as Canada will need to contribute more to this peacekeeping force than we have for too many years. Raising our defence spending from 1.4 percent to 1.5 percent, over five years, as the April budget did, would be laughable if it were not such a sad reflection of how much the Liberals do not get that it’s way past time to end our “free-rider” reputation in NATO.

Next, we have to lay out a roadmap for Russia to be able to work its way back from global pariah status. The opening phases must emphasize that Russia will need to pay a high price for its treachery and bloodshed. Russia’s frozen assets should all be seized and placed in trust for the rebuilding of Ukraine, under the supervision of an independent agency created for the purpose. 

The Russian people should be provided with the truth about Putin’s war, and its cost to Russia on every front. If he will not grant greater freedom for local and international media to operate in Russia, which seems highly unlikely, then we should use more covert digital means. For too long, the West has given Putin a free pass for cybercrime and disinformation campaigns. We have the capability to deliver a narrative grounded in reality to every Russian citizen if we choose to use the technologies we have to do so. We did it effectively for the duration of the Cold War, and it contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Our technical means are far greater today. 

Clear evidence of a commitment to moving quickly to implement an EU and NATO-wide replacement of Russian fossil fuels with alternative energy sources, hopefully increasingly green, is the most effective sanction of all. Even if Russia merely shifts some of its oil and coal trade to India and China, they have no way to export gas if the European pipeline networks are closed to them. The stunningly foolish decision to allow Gazprom and other Russian state enterprises to own key pieces of European energy infrastructure — from ports, to pipelines to storage facilities — needs to end quickly, through nationalization or by an EU-wide institution taking them over. 

When those steps have been completed, if Putin has survived, we may be ready to sit down with him to discuss easing sanctions in return for broad nuclear weapons and global security understandings. He will know that the West is capable of further tightening its chokehold on his economy if he behaves truculently or treacherously. If Putin has been removed, we should seek some proofs of integrity and reliability from his successors. If, in their battered state following defeat, they appear willing to bargain for a return to the international community, we should never forget George Kennan’s wise counsel.

“Russia can only be contained, not permanently defeated,” He wrote. It will always default to, as it has done for more than five centuries now, the use of force, or the threat of it, against its neighbours as the core of its security policy. Ronald Reagan’s famous aphorism, “trust but verify,” will be a more solid foundation for dealing with Russia than ever. But Russia will never be an entirely reliable partner. As Kennan’s Russian official confessed, “The more successful we are, the less we care about foreign opinion…keep out of our way.”   

Contributing writer Robin V. Sears, who has lived and worked as a political staffer and policy advisor in Europe and southeast Asia, is an independent consultant on crisis communications based in Ottawa.