Adam Scotti

By Peter Jones and Philippe Lagassé

June 20, 2024

This piece was first published by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on June 19, 2024. 

Not since the darkest days of the Cold War has the global situation looked so worrying.  And yet, Canada has not changed its basic approach to crafting and executing foreign, defence and security policy since the Cold War ended, and we chronically underfund the policies and capabilities we do have. In short, we continue to rely on our hopes for the “rules-based international order”, established in the aftermath of the Second World War, nearly 80 years ago.  But that order is under threat as never before in this century and we do not maintain the capability to make a suitable national contribution to the maintenance of it.

In the past few years numerous organizations, academics, foreign affairs experts and others have expressed concern about Canada’s growing irrelevance in the world. A broad consensus has emerged on the need for sustained action to repair Canada’s ability to contribute to the maintenance of a global order in keeping with our interests, our values, and which honours Canada’s historic role as a supporter of freedom and order in the world.

We believe that an urgent national effort is required to make significant and sustained investments across the entire spectrum of Canada’s engagements with the world.

We believe these interests are:

• the defence of Canada and its allies;
• the maintenance of the values and the prosperity upon which our way of life depends; and
• the need for countries to commit to the upholding of a stable international order.

To be clear, we believe that the values and interests which are crucial to Canada are individual liberty and freedom of expression; and a fair, rules-based, free and open global trading system.

We call on Canada to revitalize our means to re-engage with the world across the full range of our capabilities. In a recent paper published by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute three experts outline in greater detail what 2 per cent of GDP for defence spending could look like.  The government’s most recent defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free, made a start, but much more remains to be done if Canada is to catch up with our closest allies and go beyond “exploring” a truly revitalized defence capability.

But Canada’s ability to promote its interests in the world is not just a question of hard, military power. What is required is a sustained investment in all of the areas which constitute Canada’s ability to influence the world in ways which promote our interests. These are: foreign policy and diplomacy; Official Development Assistance (ODA); security and intelligence capabilities; and defence. Investing in one area without addressing deficiencies in the others will not result in a Canada truly able to contribute to international peace, order, and security.

To start, we call upon the Canadian government to address the commitments it has already made to our allies and the international community. These can form the basis for a concerted approach in the areas of ODA and defence.

For example, Canada accepts the UN’s call to commit 0.7 per cent of what the UN calls “Gross National Income” for ODA, but we have never come close. Our ODA has hovered around 0.3 per cent for several years. This represents slightly less than $7 Billion. To meet the 0.7 per cent target would require slightly more than doubling this figure, adjusted annually for inflation.

Deploying that money in support of our national interests requires an approach to ODA which prioritizes support for those around the world who share our values and objectives, including universal human rights and gender equality, and those whose fledgling democracies are at risk of falling back toward autocracy or authoritarianism.

This will require a much more selective approach than we have seen to date. Canadian ODA must be targeted and spent in amounts sufficient to achieve big objectives, rather than doled out in small amounts across large landscapes. The means by which recipients will be selected will be a matter of fierce debate, but a renewed commitment to meet our ODA targets requires us, above all, to re-learn the basic lesson that ODA is not simply an altruistic gift to the world; it is an investment we make to support the development of societies which share our interests and values. If done properly, ODA should not be seen as an “alternative” to other priorities, such as defence spending, but as a vital part of an integrated approach to creating the kind of world that is in keeping with our interests and values.

Canada’s ability to promote its interests in the world is not just a question of hard, military power. What is required is a sustained investment in all of the areas which constitute Canada’s ability to influence the world in ways which promote our interests.

Similarly, we officially committed to our allies in 2014 to achieve 2 per cent of GDP for defence spending. Notwithstanding notable increases in military expenditures since 2017, we chronically lounge at the bottom in any table showing what the allies are achieving. Canada is increasingly an outlier among NATO allies in not meeting this commitment. As noted in the recently published CGAI paper, if done properly a commitment to actually spend 2 per cent represents a “forcing function” which will require the government to be more effective.

This may sound like a significant departure for Canada. It is not. For example, when Lester Pearson was Prime Minister, Canada never spent less than 2.54 per cent of GDP on defence, and hit a high of 3.62 per cent. During the time of John Diefenbaker, defence spending went over 4 per cent. In comparison with what we have done before, 2 per cent is not extreme. The loss of political will to support pragmatic defence spending coincided with the end of the Cold War. Until 1989, defence spending was consistently over 2 per cent. While some may argue that letting defence spending fall was justified with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this position is no longer tenable. Canada benefited from the “peace dividend” that came with the end of the Cold War, but we are now faced with a world that is increasingly dangerous and conflictual and we must reinvest to secure a new peace.

But investment in defence and ODA, while necessary, is not enough. All of the components of Canada’s ability to interact with the world must be revisited and modernized.

There are no equivalent internationally accepted “targets” for foreign policy/diplomacy as there are for ODA and defence.  However, we believe Canadians must support increases here as well. A recent Senate of Canada report on Canada’s Foreign Service recommended that management be streamlined, greater expertise encouraged and more Canadian diplomats be posted abroad.  Similarly, a report released recently by a group of eminent former U.K. officials suggested that a 1 per cent of GDP target for both diplomacy and aid would be an appropriate goal, to go along with the 2 per cent commitment to defence spending. This target is a useful benchmark for a similar  conversation about the future of Canada’s diplomatic capacity.

Canada’s security and intelligence community is somewhat more opaque with regard to spending, but there is an emerging consensus that services such as the RCMP, CSIS, CSE and others within this community require a critical examination of whether they remain fit for purpose and are adequately resourced. Furthermore, the establishment of a foreign intelligence service is generating discussion and should be considered.

As we make these critical investments, we must recognize the rapidly evolving nature of security.  A changing climate means that the Arctic will be opened up for a variety of new uses and we must re-think what it means to “defend” it, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly has recently stated.

A rapidly transforming knowledge-based economy means that we must regard the collaborative R&D capacity of our universities and industry in fields like AI, space, cyber and many others as strategic assets to be both developed and protected as a key part of any approach to national security. As we have seen recently off the coast of Yemen, non-state actors, armed with weapons that were heretofore unavailable to them, can wreak havoc on global trade.

Peter Jones is a Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.

Philippe Lagassé is an Associate Professor in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.