Amid the urgent foreign policy challenges of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, Policy Associate Editor Lisa Van Dusen checked in with Senator Peter Boehm, chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA), on Canada’s role in resolving the crisis, the AEFA’s upcoming business — including the repurposing of seized Russian assets — and exploring whether Global Affairs Canada is “fit for purpose” in the 21st century.

Lisa Van Dusen: Last week in Brussels, NATO, the G7 and the European Council mobilized a united response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Was it effective and where does Canada fit as a player in that mix? Is there a difference right now between our middle-power role of, per Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly, “convening” and any behind-the-scenes value-added we may be providing?

Sen. Peter Boehm: Paradoxically, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has united and strengthened the G7, NATO and the European Union with common purpose as never before. He had gambled that economic sanctions would be of the same variety as those imposed following the Russian annexation of Crimea and proxy war in the Donbas in 2014. He was wrong in that the Russian Central Bank was targeted, Russia was removed from the SWIFT payments system and his cache of foreign currency plus gold reserves did not provide the buffer intended to forestall severe economic damage. The longer war is waged, the more Russian military losses mount (another Putin miscalculation), the greater the negative impact on the Russian economy. Hence Putin’s current demand that Russia’s energy customers pay in roubles. In the G7 context, the collective actions have been undertaken rapidly and without semblance of over-negotiation through a highly effective behind-the-scenes consultative process. I believe Canada has been an effective player on many fronts, but particularly on the finance/economic sanctions dossier where we have been traditionally active and where personal networks (remember Chancellor Olaf Scholz was Germany‘s finance minister and has a particularly good relationship with Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland) continue to matter. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is particularly experienced with the G7 table, having been there for seven years and among other leaders has also known US President Joe Biden the longest. With respect to NATO, we may be off the mark in terms of higher defence spenders but unlike many who demonstrate greater defence spending as a percentage of GDP we have an active troop presence — leading Operation Reassurance in Latvia in our case. The controversy over Foreign Minister Joly’s comment about our convening power is overblown. We do in fact have convening power as it is often a Canadian delegate who tries to find the compromise, moves an initiative forward, takes the recalcitrant colleague into a corner for a quiet discussion and hammers out a consensus. Or indeed comes up with a creative idea. In my experience, it is almost as if it is expected of us. Do we get the credit? Not always. But after all, diplomacy is often seen as the ability to let someone else have your way.

LVD: How did you process the news of the Liberal-NDP confidence-and-supply agreement — it actually seems like, other angles aside, a successful diplomatic exercise — and what are the possibilities of foreign/trade policy being impacted by it?

SPB: It is important to realize what this agreement is not. Were it a coalition in a traditional sense (i.e. as in Germany), it would mean there would be some NDP cabinet ministers and there would be a more formal policy agreement, a sort of mandate letter for the entire government. Using the German analogy again, the chancellor is a Social Democrat and the foreign minister is from the Green Party so you might have differing views come forward. But foreign and defence policy are not explicitly included in the confidence-and-supply agreement as they fall under the Crown Prerogative, meaning that the executive (the prime minister and cabinet) will make those determinations. So, it will be important to see whether the April 7th budget includes increased defence spending. On the other hand, the government’s announcement to proceed with the acquisition of F-35 fighter jets may already serve as a harbinger of what is to come. I have noted NDP leader Jagmeet Singh’s comment about not being in favour of increased NATO spending as a percentage of GDP. That commitment, which is aspirational, was undertaken by NATO leaders including then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2014 at the Cardiff Summit. I recall, while deputy minister of International Development, working hard and eventually succeeding in getting a $1.5 billion increase in our Official Development Assistance towards the OECD goal of 0.7 percent of Gross National Income. It registered as a blip because our economy expanded. Percentages are not all they are cracked up to be. It is the effectiveness of your investment that counts.

LVD: Your agenda for the AEFA committee always provides an interesting window on the government’s priorities and looming concerns. What’s on the menu for the rest of this sitting?

SPB: First, we are limited as to the number of meetings we can have as long as we meet in a hybrid format. We are down to one meeting per sitting week as opposed to two. It is simply a question of how our technical resources are deployed across the Senate with the priority given to government-initiated legislation and business. Second, the Russian war in Ukraine has become the priority. We have had one meeting devoted entirely to assessing the very fluid current situation and I suspect we will return to that theme again and again. Related to that is Bill S-217, introduced by my colleague Senator Ratna Omidvar, which is “An Act respecting the repurposing of certain seized, frozen or sequestrated assets”. Anyone for an oligarch’s yacht? This would build upon the “Sergei Magnitzy Law” and other sanctions-related measures in offering yet another tool to apply pressure but also a means to distribute ill-gotten gains where support may be needed most. We are hoping to finish debate soon so this rather timely bill can move from the Senate to the House of Commons for review and, hopefully, swift enactment. As we look ahead, both the Sergei Magnitzky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act are up for parliamentary review this year. A longer-range project I would like to see would be a study into the effectiveness of Canada’s free trade agreements in a post-pandemic and hopefully post-war context. However, we may not get there before the summer break.

LVD: You’re planning a new review of Global Affairs Canada. What are the issues that make that imperative today, both in terms of current institutional weak points and changes in the international operating environment?

SPB: As someone who had spent his public service career at Global Affairs Canada in all of its incarnations, I believe the time is at hand for a study into whether and how that department is “fit for purpose” in the 21st century. The way of conducting diplomatic business has changed, the risks in terms of policy and to the individual have somehow become greater, the data and virtual information revolutions have and will continue to have an impact. The Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service published its recommendations in 1981, the year I joined the foreign service. I used a pen and a notebook then and was criticized for requesting a typewriter for my office. We soon moved to desktops and laptops. There have been no such studies despite changes in the way we work, the advent of the 24/7 internet, social media and the emergence of exciting demographic changes in our country. Canada has 175 missions abroad. The Trade Commissioner Service was rolled into the former Department of External Affairs in the early 1980s and the Canadian International Development Agency was amalgamated into the department in 2013. What has been the impact of these changes? What of recruitment? Value for money? How do we look after our personnel overseas? But most of all, why does this matter to Canada and Canadians? This study will not be a lofty foreign policy review but a serious attempt to provide recommendations as to how, in practical terms, Canada can best succeed in the implementation of its foreign, trade, international development and consular policies. We will call forward many witnesses and make comparisons with how other countries are addressing similar challenges. Barring pandemics and wars, I expect the study to take about a year.

Senator Peter Boehm, a regular contributor to Policy magazine, is a former senior diplomat and current chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He served as Canada’s Sherpa for six G7 summits. 

Lisa Van Dusen is associate editor and deputy publisher of Policy Magazine. She was Washington/international affairs columnist for the Ottawa Citizen and Sun Media, international writer for Peter Jennings at ABC News, and an editor at AP National in New York and UPI in Washington.