We are delighted to begin a week-long series of articles by graduate students at the Max Bell School of Public Policy at McGill University. Look for them here in our Online Analysis section.

Asif Imran Khan

June 14, 2021

More than a year after the emergence of COVID-19, the much-anticipated World Health Organization (WHO) investigative report on the zoonotic source of the virus was finally published last March. The findings of the report have been underwhelming, to say the least. A US led multi-country joint statement stated that report “lacked access to complete, original data and samples.” The Biden administration laid the blame on China for political obfuscation and lack of cooperation in determining the source of the virus, which is widely accepted as having generated from the Chinese city of Wuhan. China, on the other hand, blamed the West using the pandemic for political manipulation and informed WHO that it considered that the country’s part of origin tracing investigation to be complete.

Such political bickering is a disservice to any genuine effort to identify the source of a global pandemic that has claimed more than 3.5 million lives worldwide. It also sheds an unprecedented negative light on WHO, for its incapability to penetrate through political obfuscation. It is, after all, the United Nations system’s sole health-focused organization with the central responsibility to manage the global regime for the control of the international spread of disease.

COVID-19 shows that the consequence of a global pandemic can be no less devastating than the impact of a weapon of mass destruction.

But WHO’s shortcomings would not surprise anyone aware of the organization’s limitations in official operational authority in outbreak prevention and response. WHO’s primary policy instrument in governing pandemic threats, the International Health Regulations (IHR), only provides it with a soft power that cannot be legally enforced. Thus, WHO is dependent of the member states’ cooperation and solidarity for operationalizing its directives and efforts. Critically, WHO suffers from a considerable limitation in funding that exacerbate its limitations in coordination and technical roles.

The shortcomings in the pandemic response can also be traced to the global health security framework, which has placed global health within the security paradigm. Unless the infectious disease threats were presented as a national security threat, the global health is not necessarily supported and funded by the wealthy states primarily concerned about their own security. This problematic framing prioritizes funding for political and military elites over global health efforts, and ultimately undermines global policy and institutional efforts to prevent and control pandemics.

While it is easy to be disillusioned by the weaknesses of global structures in a time of crisis, past UN-led global efforts in the field of chemical weapons show that there are reasons for optimism. Three decades ago, in the aftermath of the Cold War era proliferation of chemical weapons, the UN adopted the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The treaty, binding under international law, prohibits the large-scale use, development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Its strong verification and compliance mechanisms are enforced by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has the authority to conduct rapid on-site inspection, request a party to redress a situation, restrict a party’s rights and privileges, and recommend sanctions to the UN. As of today, 98 percent of the global population is protected under the Convention, with 193 states currently party to the CWC.  The OPCW was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 for its efforts in eliminating chemical weapons.

COVID-19 shows that the consequences of a global pandemic can be no less devastating than the impact of a weapon of mass destruction. While the post-Cold War era sentiment ushered in the formulation of the considerably successful global treaty, the post-COVID-19 era calls for similar global effort to adopt a legally binding international treaty for pandemic preparedness and response. Such a treaty should aim to strengthen and enforce global disease surveillance, and can be instrumental in working through political obfuscation to ensure transparency and accountability of the member states. It is also essential that the treaty be coupled with a strong institutional structure similar to the OPCW, with independent authority to monitor, investigate and recommend sanctions in case of non-compliance.

An effective WHO is crucial to not only lead the conversation towards the adoption of the proposed convention for pandemic, but also to play the key technical role should the highest UN authority choose to take the lead.

The post-COVID-19 world demands due respect for global health governance without the justification within global security framing for developed countries’ prioritization. That would also mean sustainably funding and capacitating WHO to undertake its mandate and ensure compliance to IHR. An effective WHO is crucial to not only lead the conversation towards the adoption of the proposed convention for pandemics, but also to play the key technical role should the highest UN authority choose to take the lead.

COVID-19 provides many harsh lessons, but it also presents an opportunity to re-envision prevailing structures based on global best practices, and to mobilize political commitment in the battle against future infectious disease outbreaks. When the cost is as high as millions of lives, it is incumbent upon the world to make the best of the crisis. When the cost is as high as millions of lives, it is incumbent upon the world to make the best of the opportunity.

Asif Imran Khan is a Master’s student at the Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University.