By Robin Sears

February 19, 2024

This is but the latest chapter in Myanmar’s struggle for democracy, which — from its independence in 1948 through its shedding of the colonial name of Burma in 1989, through the democratic rise of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) — has swung like a pendulum between military dictatorship and elected government.

After the country’s democratic transition began in 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi finally became state counsellor. Her National League for Democracy won another landslide victory in 2020, but the military once more seized power on February 1, 2021 before the government could be sworn in. The coup triggered massive protests. Far more threatening to the military junta, or Tatmadaw, were the speed and skill of the defeated government in galvanizing the entire opposition. Within weeks, they had established an alternative power centre, the National Unity Government (NUG) — for which I, full disclosure, serve as an unofficial advisor — with multi-ethnic representation in its leadership, including the Rohingya, for the first time in the nation’s history.

Thousands of young people fled to the cities to join the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) — the NUG’s army — transformed from shop clerks and students into guerrilla fighters in training camps in the highland jungles. Today, the PDF and the ethnic armed organizations fight under joint commands, their unity a weapon against decades of tactical ethnic division sown by the military. They have now seized nearly half of the national territory.

Three things make this challenge different from any previous battle with the Tatmadaw. First, today’s resistance struggle comes after nearly a decade of partial democratization under the NLD. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back.

Secondly, the army badly miscalculated the skillful political leaders of the government they had deposed. The NUG quickly reached out internally to build political and military alliances with the now-powerful ethnic community governments and armies; and externally to a broad network of international allies.

Within a year, the PDF and the so-called “ethnic armed organisations” were creating new legal, medical and educational institutions on the ground in liberated territories. A year later, a series of attacks by the NUG’s military joint commands were inflicting heavy losses on the Tatmadaw.

Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back.

Finally, the wanton cruelty and lawlessness with which the junta waged war; bombing schools, hospitals, and entire villages began to turn sentiment even in its former strongholds. The opposition took in thousands of defectors and many thousands of Myanmar people fled into neighbouring countries. This year, the army has begun forcible kidnapping of citizens to serve as its porters and human shields. It recently announced a massive conscription drive, which the NUG has vowed to resist.

The most serious turning point came last fall, when the world was watching the Middle East. On October 27, the joint rebel forces of the Three Brotherhood Alliance staged “Operation 1027”, capturing key cities, towns, and military basesalong the northern border with China. It was a shock to the junta and a deep concern to Beijing. China’s always-opportunistic foreign policy was strained by this new turn in the conflict. They had carefully balanced support for the junta, feeding it billions of dollars in resource revenues and military assistance, and the ethnic organizations, several of whom were of majority Chinese ethnicity. It seems likely that as the opposition continues to seize more territory, and morale among the junta forces sags more and more deeply, that China will in the end support the opposition. China rarely backs a loser, and the junta’s days seem numbered.

The big question facing the NUG now is what happens the day after victory. The country has no history of shared governance. In some areas, they have only decades of warfare. The institutions on the ground, for a country of 55 million people, in medicine, law and local governance are shallow or non-existent. The challenges of finding common ground among peoples who are separated by language, history, and in the case of the Rohingya and other Muslims, by religion, could not be more daunting.

Some regional pundits predict that a new opposition government will inevitably fail over internal tensions within a year or two and the army will come marching back in. That is not merely spin on behalf of the war criminals who lead the Tatmadaw. They have billions of dollars squirrelled away from decades of corruption. They have a massive military infrastructure. They have a record of success in stirring up conflict between and among the various ethnic communities who surround them.

Still, it would not be prudent to see this latest battle against the military as facing the same end as previous collisions. For the reasons cited above — new alliances, a new generation of citizen soldiers committed to democracy, and a skillful and demonstrably capable cadre of leaders already successful in creating a new government with a broad commitment to a loosely federal democracy; this time, the odds are better.

The early months, post-victory, will turn on how quickly and how firmly a new government can bring all of its internal partners to agree on some governance minimums. They have wisely set the consensus bar low, and the transition process long. They recognize that communities that have operated as nation states, with their own legal systems, taxation frameworks, and local bureaucracies are not quickly going to cede all of that to a new central government in Yangon.

Nor are they going to be willing to make detailed long-term commitments without some evidence that there is a feasible path forward that includes everyone. The tension has already emerged behind the scenes between the seize-the-moment, ‘go faster’ caucus and the careful, ‘slow and patient’ caucus.

As Canada’s constitutional wars revealed, the only successful path forward — with far fewer issues and groups — is one of slow trust-building, endless meetings that build that trust, friendships across borders, and the recognition that one may need many small steps over many years before even seeing the finish line. Our process took nearly 40 years, from Victoria to Charlottetown, and is only partially successful to this day. Canada and other nations have contributed some of our best brains in constitution-making to the most difficult and risky task there is in governing.

Another key early task will be swift investigation and then prosecution of war crimes. Not only because it is the essential moral responsibility after a conflict so targeted at killing women and children, but also because it will give early proof and confidence to a skeptical nation that this time it really will be different.

Russia and China have been aiding the junta in training and equipment on the battlefield. They have to understand that they could become the targets of greater sanctions than those already imposed — and that they are wasting their time and money on a losing battle. The ASEAN nations have been powerless in attempting to find a way to return to democracy — not entirely surprising, since fewer than half of the members can claim any democratic credentials themselves.

Canada has an international expert on Myanmar in our service in UN Ambassador (and Policy contributor) Bob Rae, who did the definitive study of the Rohingya genocide and its consequences. He remains deeply involved in bridge-building among allies of the fight for democracy. The EU and the US have both strongly condemned the junta, and granted money and political support to the NUG.

This year could be the year that these elements come together. With greater public support, and private assistance from its international allies, 2024 could be the year that Myanmar returns to the club of nations attempting to build stable and free democracies.

Veteran political strategist and Policy Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears lived and worked in Tokyo as Ontario’s senior diplomat and later as a management consultant in Hong Kong. Today he serves as a volunteer senior advisor to the leadership of the NUG.