Of all the elements of liberal democracy that have been altered by the Fourth Industrial Revolution — from representative government to journalism to the intelligence community to free speech to electoral infrastructure to the integrity of public information — diplomacy is among the most under-reported spheres of transformation. Michael W. Manulak of Carleton University and Duncan Snidal of Nuffield College, Oxford, help fill the gap.

Michael W. Manulak
and Duncan Snidal

“My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” declared British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston upon receiving his first telegraphic message in the 1860s. Now “Zoom diplomacy” — and digital diplomacy more generally — are provoking similar reactions. Why send diplomats abroad when international meetings can be convened so readily without anyone ever leaving the Quai d’Orsay, Foggy Bottom or the Pearson Building?

While the telegraph did alter substantially diplomatic practice, predictions of the demise of diplomacy were greatly exaggerated. The same goes for the digital revolution in diplomacy. The return to in-person meetings, including the recent United Nations climate change conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, and the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, suggests that videoconferences and other digital technologies will not soon replace conference diplomacy or resident ambassadors.

Yet, despite a return to in-person meetings, it is worth considering the longer-term impact of digital technologies on intergovernmental relations. Zoom diplomacy is, of course, just the latest phase of a now three-decade long digital transformation in international relations.

While the extensive use of social media platforms such as Twitter has also transformed public diplomacy, we focus here on the deeper and more fundamental implications of new technologies for the conduct of multilateralism and the design of international institutions.

Digital modes of diplomacy have many advantages. For governments, the costs of posting delegates abroad or hosting an international meeting can be significant. While this may not limit meetings among top officials, lower-level exchanges that can be moved online are more likely to succumb to the requirements of fiscal discipline. Even for wealthy governments, resources are scarce and cost considerations will sometimes favour online meetings that previously would have been convened in person.

Another factor is time. The time requirements — particularly for senior government leadership — of trips abroad are considerable. The proliferation of summit-level meetings, for example, represents a significant draw on leaders’ time, leading in recent years to steps to cluster international meetings together. In times of domestic political turbulence, the time pressure of international travel is felt most acutely. In addition, the ability of world leaders to come together on short notice online during international crises is especially valuable, as the G7 response to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has made clear.

Online exchanges also reduce the carbon footprint of diplomacy, an important consideration in the midst of our climate crisis.

But digital meetings lack certain key advantages of in-person gatherings — including the greater privacy of offline communication, the personal element, the opportunity to conduct discreet corridor conversations, the greater possibility of fast agreements, the ability to make highly visible joint commitments, and the possibility of serendipity. For such reasons, in-person diplomacy will continue even as states take up the advantages afforded by online meetings. Assuming that digital platforms will continue to play a role in diplomacy, the operative question is: how much of a role? How will digital diplomacy further change traditional diplomacy?

While it is impossible to answer these questions definitively, our research has shed historical light on the disintermediating role of information, communication and transportation technologies on diplomatic affairs. These technologies all reduce the significance of distance, which has historically served as a chief motivator for diplomatic representation. So far, there have been three main implications for diplomacy.

First, new technologies have made international cooperation less formal. Instead of relying on traditional intergovernmental organizations, such as those of the United Nations system, serviced by international secretariats and often requiring permanent diplomatic missions, states are increasingly opting for informal mechanisms. Alternatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative or the Alliance for Multilateralism, which are run by government officials based in capitals, have become increasingly common. These institutions do not require the creation of secretariats or delegation by leaders to diplomatic missions abroad, but instead build on recurring summits organized through Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs). High-level exchanges are coupled with ongoing interactions among networks of lower-level national officials based in capitals, rather than via professional diplomats posted to formal international organizations. 

Indeed, since the 1990s, there has been a quadrupling of the number of IIGOs, such as the G20 or the BRICS. There has been a similar explosion in the number of lower-level Trans-Governmental Networks, such as the International Network of Drinking-Water Regulators or the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, whereby domestically-based national officials coordinate supporting activities for international cooperation. In the same period, the number of formal international organizations has plateaued and may now be in decline.

Heads of state or government are steering an increased share of international interactions directly through informal venues.

The increasingly informal design of international institutions constitutes the most significant shift in the character of international cooperation since the early post-Second World War phase of formal institution-building. These informal institutions, based on voluntary political commitments rather than binding legal obligations, enable a flexible mode of cooperation that can adapt swiftly to fast-changing global developments. The availability of digital technologies — such as email, password-protected websites and Zoom meetings — allow these informal modes of cooperation to flourish without the heavy facilitating bureaucracy of formal organizations and permanent secretariats. It also limits the creation or expansion of supranational authority.

Second, the conduct of foreign policy is being transformed by these more direct means of international engagement. The proliferation of informal leader-level dialogues has fuelled a need at the centre of governments to augment the international policy capacity of the offices of heads of state and government. In Canada, the international policy resources of the Privy Council Office, for example, have increased greatly since the 1990s. In the United States, the size of the National Security Council, which reports directly to the president, has grown five-fold. Such developments have altered the conduct of international cooperation at home in order to augment channels of leader-level exchange.

In parallel, the growth of lower-level technical and regulatory networks has led to extensive international dialogue among government experts contained within departments with a primarily domestic mandate. Hundreds of networks now facilitate the exchange of best practices on a range of policy issues, from atmospheric science to health regulation to the administration of export controls. These regulators and technical experts are, in the words of New America Foundation President Anne-Marie Slaughter, “the new diplomats,” using new digital tools to improve national public administration.

In short, foreign ministries face competition from both above and from below. Heads of state or government are steering an increased share of international interactions directly through informal venues. Similarly, line departments—traditionally subordinate to foreign ministries on international questions—may be especially advantaged by new techniques for international communications that enable direct interaction with their foreign counterparts. The move away from legally-binding obligations, moreover, has led states to increasingly opt for executive agreements that are less subject to democratic oversight but can more easily be overturned by new government administrations.

Third, the digital revolution has implications for global power relations. Since participation in heavily networked modes of governance requires significant bureaucratic depth, growth in informal institutions has resulted in a disproportionate deepening of ties among developed countries. While larger states find it more expedient to conduct international affairs among themselves without more formal constraints, smaller and less developed states find participation in such a wide range of informal bodies difficult to sustain bureaucratically. Developed and developing countries continue to interact within many formal organizations, but the explosion of informal fora among developed states has increased the proportion of North-North dialogues relative to North-South or South-South ones.

While formal institutions continue to offer many advantages relative to informal ones and are often important complements to them, they are occupying a decreasing market share of global cooperative relations. The proliferation of informal bodies can increase fragmentation, offering “work-arounds” for deadlocked institutions, perhaps limiting the incentive among states for the hard work of negotiating agreements among parties with differing priorities.

Where lies the future of the digital diplomatic revolution? We believe that these trends will continue. The cost, time, and environmental advantages of digital tools will ensure that these technologies play an important role in the future. The benefits of cooperation through informal institutions, facilitated by digital technologies, have now been amply demonstrated. Technical networks, in particular, are likely to benefit greatly from the increased use of videoconferencing; Zoom diplomacy is exceptionally well-suited to smaller-scale exchanges between and among like-minded countries. Videoconferencing is less suitable, at this stage, for big international gatherings, such as the United Nations General Assembly.

The ongoing use of informal institutions will continue to generate demand within senior executive offices and line departments for increased international policy capacity. Foreign ministries may have shrinking space for autonomous action in this ongoing evolution of diplomacy. One response, as proposed in a recent report by Ulric Shannon, a foreign service officer on exchange at the University of Ottawa, is for foreign ministries to better complement the subject-matter expertise possessed by line departments.

The trends affecting global power relations are, perhaps, the most concerning and demand deliberate steps to limit global division. Improved lines of communication on a North/South basis, including deliberate efforts to foster the participation of developing countries within technical dialogues, are of special relevance here. Security and access considerations around these technologies will factor in, undoubtedly shaping usage. Availability of secure platforms may advantage links among powerful states. 

Informal links appear to be less dense among geopolitical rivals, particularly between western democracies and autocratic states such as China and Russia. In the past, lower-level technical exchanges, including track-two discussions via fora such as Pugwash conferences, have been used as a means of facilitating détente. Rejuvenating such lower-level dialogues may serve as a future means of launching higher-level exchanges to defuse global tensions.

The digital transformation has already had important implications for the conduct of diplomacy and will continue to re-shape international cooperation. There is no putting the digital genie back in the bottle, diplomatically speaking. Rather than the end of diplomacy, however, the digital transformation provides an opportunity to reshape multilateralism. Just as the telegraph created new opportunities for global relations, digital technologies have created new possibilities for diplomacy and will continue to do so. The key challenge will be figuring out how to take advantage of these new opportunities to tackle global problems and strengthen international collaboration. 

Michael W. Manulak, is Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. He is author of Change in Global Environmental Politics: Temporal Focal Points and the Reform of International Institutions.

Duncan Snidal is Professor of International Relations at Nuffield College, Oxford and a member of the British Academy. He is co-author of The Spectrum of International Institutions: An Interdisciplinary Collaboration on Global Governance.