Throughout the decades between the end of the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and the 1995 sovereignty referendum, the “Quebec question” was shorthand for the debate over sovereignty and the constitutional  status of the province within Canada. In the past 15 years, the province’s identity debate has shifted away from sovereignty and constitutional politics to questions of religious and cultural diversity and human rights. McGill Institute for the Study of Canada Director Daniel Béland reports on the political trajectory from “reasonable accommodation” to “Quebec values” to a new kind of Quebec nationalism.

Daniel Béland

When the first issue of Policy magazine appeared in April 2013, Justin Trudeau had just been elected leader of the federal Liberal Party, physician Philippe Couillard had just been chosen to lead the Quebec Liberal Party, and Pauline Marois was just beginning her final year as the first woman premier of Quebec. The province was in what we might call the second stage of a nearly two-decade identity debate that has polarized left and right on questions of assimilation vs. pluralism to the point of eclipsing its longstanding divide over sovereignty, and whose third stage is ongoing at this writing.

At the helm of a Parti Québécois (PQ) minority government since September 2012, Marois in 2013 tried to increase the popularity of her party among francophone voters through the proposed Charter of Quebec Values. The focus on secularism was a clear attempt to seduce Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ) voters, because the ADQ had been criticizing “reasonable accommodation” —  the legal and constitutional concept that requires that institutions (such as employers and government) accommodate, up to a certain point, the beliefs and practices of all Canadian citizens — since the mid-late 2000s. The debate over reasonable accommodation had led to the creation in February 2007 by Liberal Premier Jean Charest of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, led by historian and sociologist Gérard Bouchard and Templeton Prize-winning philosopher Charles Taylor. Later in 2007, this debate helped the ADQ finish in second place behind the Liberals, but ahead of the PQ, in the provincial election.

According to journalist Francine Pelletier, who produced a powerful and controversial documentary on the topic, the events of 2007 and, five years later, the advent of the Marois PQ minority government, are key turning points in the rise of “conservative nationalism,” an approach that emphasizes the preservation of the francophone majority’s language and culture in a context where support for sovereignty is declining or at least stagnant.

This last trend also means that, for the first time since the late 1960s, the federalism-sovereignty divide is no longer the main cleavage within Quebec politics. The rise of conservative nationalism and the decline of the federalism-sovereignty divide hurt both the PQ and the Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ), two parties that dominated Quebec politics from the early 1970s through the 2018 provincial election, in the aftermath of which the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) under François Legault formed a majority government.

The rise of the CAQ, the successor of the now defunct ADQ, is the symbol of the triumph of conservative nationalism in Quebec for the first time since the Duplessis era, which ended with his death in 1959 and the Union Nationale’s subsequent loss to the Liberals of Jean Lesage in 1960.  Although François Legault is hardly a carbon copy of Maurice Duplessis, both leaders are associated with the idea of provincial autonomy and the protection of the perceived values of francophone voters in la Belle Province.

Over the last decade, the electoral and political realignment that first manifested itself clearly during the 2007 provincial elections was completed in the context of the rise of the CAQ and the combined decline of the PQ and the PLQ. Regarding the PQ, it lost power in the aftermath of the April 2014 provincial elections, which saw the PLQ return to power under Premier Philippe Couillard. At the time, the PQ was still able to finish in second place with 30 seats, significantly ahead of the recently created CAQ, which won 18 seats that year.

At the 2018 provincial elections, however, the PQ collapsed and won only 10 seats in total. Four years later, last fall, the PQ secured only three seats despite the strong campaign performance of its current leader, Paul St-Pierre Plamondon. Beyond lacklustre support for sovereignty, a key factor behind the decline of the PQ is the rise of Québec Solidaire (QS), a left-wing party that also supports sovereignty, although not as centrally at the PQ. Because past efforts to merge the PQ and QS failed, the sovereigntist camp is clearly divided and QS is especially popular among younger francophones living in larger cities, including Montreal, where the PQ currently holds only one seat.

Ironically, the decline of support for sovereignty is also widely considered to be a key factor behind the decline of the PLQ, which only won 31 and 21 seats out of 125 in 2018 and 2022, respectively. Because sovereignty is no longer on the ballot, the PLQ is deprived of its traditional role of defending federalism and national unity. In the past, when the PQ was its main electoral foe, the PLQ could stress its rejection of sovereignty and its opposition to a new referendum on the topic to score political points, something it cannot do anymore facing the CAQ, which also opposes such a referendum.

Simultaneously, the PLQ is victim of what is known is French as “usure du pouvoir,” which refers to the negative side of being in power for a long period of time. In the case of the PLQ, it was in power between 2003 and 2012, under Charest, and then again between 2014 and 2018 under Couillard. During these two periods, unpopular measures were enacted and their negative impact accumulated over time. This was especially the case for the Couillard government, which was heavily criticized for its cuts in social services and a highly controversial health care reform program. To make things worse, a perceived lack of nationalistic fervour (which contrasts with the CAQ’s aggressive push for provincial autonomy) has also created serious image problems for the PLQ among francophone voters.

Because of the combined decline of the PQ and the PLQ and the recent electoral stagnation of QS, which has so far failed to gain meaningful support outside large cities, the CAQ dominates Quebec’s current party system, which is much more fragmented than before. This is the case not only because of the rise of QS but also, during the last provincial campaign, of the rise of the Conservative Party of Quebec (CPQ). Yet, because that party failed to win a seat in the National Assembly, despite receiving nearly 13 percent of the popular vote across the province, the CAQ remains the main vehicle for conservative nationalism, despite attempts by the PQ since the Marois years to emphasize “Quebec values,” including and especially secularism.

Right now, the CAQ remains dominant among older francophone voters, a situation that has hurt both the PQ and the PLQ. At the same time, the CAQ has failed to gain much ground on the Island of Montreal, where it currently holds only two seats out of 27. On the province’s electoral map, while Montreal is mainly PLQ red and QS orange, the rest of the province is overwhelmingly CAQ blue. The positions of the CAQ on immigration and the statements of Premier Legault during the campaign linking immigration with “extremism” and “violence” certainly did not help his party in Montreal, where so many immigrants and anglophones live. The same applies to Bill 21 on secularism and Bill 96 on the French language, two pieces of legislation that have proved especially controversial on the Island of Montreal.

Clearly, the controversy over Bill 21 and Bill 96 has not prevented the CAQ from remaining popular among older francophones, who, on average, support both of them.

Beyond these remarks, these two bills have raised key constitutional questions that are relevant across the country. This is primarily the case because of the pre-emptive use of the notwithstanding clause, which is an especially controversial aspect of both Bill 21 and Bill 96. Both pieces of legislation raise important questions about the proper balance between majority rule and the protection of individual and minority rights that might only be settled by the Supreme Court, someday.    

Clearly, the controversy over Bill 21 and Bill 96  has not prevented the CAQ from remaining popular among older francophones, who, on average, support both of them. As for the fact that these two laws are less popular in Montreal, it is not a significant political and electoral challenge for the CAQ,  which has been able to win two consecutive majority governments without winning more than a couple of seats on the island of Montreal. Conversely, the Liberals cannot return to power without improving dramatically their electoral performance outside of Montreal, including strongly francophone areas of the province where the CAQ is now dominant.

The Liberals are currently  looking for a new leader after the resignation and departure from political life of former leader Dominique Anglade following the October election. Unfortunately for the PLQ, it will take more than a new leader to address all the challenges facing the party among francophone voters, who have largely deserted Quebec’s oldest political party.

As for the CAQ, it is now the dominant political party in Quebec and its leader, Premier Legault, remains one of the most popular premiers in the country. In this context, we cannot talk about “usure du pouvoir” yet for the CAQ. As we saw again during last year’s provincial campaign, however, Legault is prone to gaffes and can be his own worst political enemy. Simultaneously, like other jurisdictions in the country, Quebec faces major challenges such as high inflation and a health care crisis, which is particularly acute in the province.

On the identity front, the future of the French language remains a key issue for francophone voters and here the PQ is pressuring the CAQ government to do more in that regard. The same applies to immigration policy, where the CAQ is seeking more powers from the federal government, partly to do more to protect French.

Yet, the CAQ also claims to be “the party of the economy,” a title long held by the Liberals. There is a clear tension here between the economy and some of the identity-related measures put forward by the CAQ, which is particularly the case in the field of immigration policy, in a province where many regions face acute labour shortages. Will the CAQ be able to strike a proper balance between economic imperatives and identity politics? The answer to this question is likely to determine whether the party will remain in power for many years to come.

But looking back over the last 10 years, it has been a decade of profound political change in terms of political party brands in Quebec. The CAQ is the clear and enduring winner of this shift, which has consolidated the rise of conservative nationalism in the province.   

Contributing Writer Daniel Béland is Director of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada and James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University.