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By Stewart Beck and Hugh Stephens

April 22, 2025

Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) was an important recognition of Asia’s centrality to global affairs and of the region’s importance to Canada. Given changes brought about by the return of the Trump administration, evolving ASEAN dynamics, and shifting US-China relations, some have questioned whether the IPS is still relevant. In our view, it is more relevant than ever but needs a recalibration. Drawing on our combined experience across the region, in various capacities involving diplomatic, business, trade policy, trade development, and strategic roles, we propose a “Pacific Pathway” for Canada that would build upon the foundation of the IPS while adapting to these new realities through a more focused, and strategically autonomous approach.

Our proposed Pathway would particularly emphasize Canada’s potential contributions to addressing emerging security challenges across the region—climate change, food security, energy security, public health, and digital security—areas where Canada has established expertise and credibility, and which increasingly concern regional populations, rather than focusing on a limited and largely symbolic increase in military assets in the region. By addressing these challenges that transcend traditional security frameworks, Canada can bring distinctive value to regional partnerships while advancing its own interests. Our recommendations reflect not just theoretical constructs, but insights gained through direct engagement with Asian governments, businesses, and civil society.

Strategic Autonomy: The Defining Framework

The cornerstone of our proposed Pacific Pathway for Canada would be strategic autonomy—making independent assessments and pursuing Canadian interests while maintaining valued partnerships. Unlike the original IPS, this approach explicitly recognizes that Canada’s interests, while often aligned with allies, do not always coincide. Strategic autonomy would enhance Canada’s value as a partner by contributing independent capabilities and perspectives to shared challenges.

We believe Canada can particularly distinguish itself by focusing on transnational challenges—areas where Canada has demonstrated expertise and credibility. These include climate change resilience, food and water security, energy security, public health, and digital security. By prioritizing these domains, Canada can make unique contributions that complement traditional security approaches while addressing issues of immediate concern to regional populations. This is a different focus than the emphasis on military operations, training and capacity building in the region contained in the original IPS. Rather, Canada would be best to devote its limited military assets to defend of our own coastline and Arctic areas.

This approach would require substantive development of Canadian knowledge and capabilities. It will require investing more in Asia-specific expertise across government, academia, and the private sector. It would necessitate developing independent intelligence and assessment capabilities focused on the region. Most importantly, we believe it demands clear articulation of distinctly Canadian interests in Asia rather than simply echoing the positions of larger allies.

Partners across the region value Canada most when it brings distinct perspectives and capabilities to the table. Asia’s diversity demands nuanced understanding, and our recommendations draw from firsthand insights into how Canadian interests can align with regional priorities while maintaining independent positions.

Energy and Economic Engagement: A Pragmatic Evolution

While the original IPS emphasized climate change cooperation, we propose incorporating energy security concerns that have gained urgency across Asia. We need a comprehensive Indo-Pacific Energy Partnership that would balance traditional energy exports with clean technology cooperation.

This partnership would create Canada-Asia energy dialogue mechanisms where government serves as a catalyst for industry and institutional participation. It would develop regulatory and diplomatic frameworks that facilitate specific LNG export opportunities to energy-insecure economies including Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan. It would establish innovation partnerships in clean energy technologies with regional centers such as Singapore through initial convening and seed funding. The approach would foster integration of Canadian critical minerals strategies with Asian counterparts, responding to established initiatives such as Japan’s strategic overseas investment approach, South Korea’s public-private partnerships, and India’s Critical Minerals Mission. It would stimulate joint ventures connecting Canadian mining expertise with Asian processing capabilities, particularly in nickel (Indonesia), rare earths (both Japan and Malaysia have invested in rare-earth processing to reduce reliance on China), and battery materials (South Korea). Additionally, it would enable bilateral supply chain resilience agreements providing certainty for both Canadian producers and Asian manufacturers and develop financing frameworks that spark private investment in energy projects that balance immediate needs with climate commitments.

Beyond energy, we propose connecting Canada’s domestic infrastructure discourse (espoused by both major political parties) with regional opportunities. In a departure from the original IPS, we recommend creating supportive investment frameworks whereby government functions as a catalyst—through targeted risk mitigation tools, regulatory adjustments, and diplomatic agreements—that could attract Canadian institutional investors, including pension funds, to commercially viable infrastructure projects both within Canada (that enhance Asia-Pacific connectivity) and in Asian partner countries. This approach recognizes that these institutions make independent decisions based on fiduciary responsibilities and risk-return profiles, with government enabling rather than directing investment flows.

Sectoral approaches often yield faster results than comprehensive deals. It makes sense for more targeted sectoral agreements where comprehensive trade deals prove challenging. This includes developing specific initiatives for agricultural products, digital services, and advanced manufacturing—areas where Canada has competitive advantages but currently limited Asian market share.

Regional Engagement: Strategic Prioritization

Where the IPS took a broad regional approach, we advocate for strategic prioritization that would maximize impact with limited resources, with particular emphasis on addressing human security concerns where Canada has established expertise:

Indonesia Focus: We recommend elevating Indonesia to Comprehensive Strategic Partner status with concrete initiatives in maritime security, climate adaptation, food security, and educational cooperation. As ASEAN’s largest economy and a key democratic voice facing significant cross-border challenges, Indonesia offers Canada both meaningful partnership opportunities and influence in the broader region.

Pragmatic China Policy: Our proposed approach to China would establish clearly defined areas for pragmatic engagement while maintaining a principles-based framework that aligns with Canadian values and interests. Drawing from earlier strategic thinking, including an unpublished 2021 concept paper prepared by knowledgeable China experts for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, we recognize that Canada must develop a “variable geometry” approach that allows for selective engagement across different domains rather than an all-or-nothing stance. This approach would maintain effective engagement with China in domains of mutual benefit, particularly on cross-border issues including climate action, pandemic prevention, and food security, while articulating Canadian interests independently from both Chinese and American positions to preserve Canadian sovereignty and policy flexibility.

We envision establishing distinct frameworks of engagement across different sectors—cooperative in global challenges such as climate change and public health, competitive in economic domains requiring market reciprocity and intellectual property protection, and principled on human rights and governance issues. This nuanced approach extends to investment screening as well, where Canada would benefit from a strategic, case-by-case evaluation of Chinese investments rather than categorical restrictions. For instance, in sectors such as electric vehicle manufacturing, where Chinese investment could help Canada build domestic production capacity and potentially offset the impact of protectionist measures from the United States, a pragmatic assessment of benefits versus security concerns would serve Canadian interests better than blanket policies. Such investments would require appropriate safeguards and transparency mechanisms but could contribute significantly to Canadian economic resilience.

Specifically, we propose establishing a Canada-China Eminent Persons’ Group—like the mechanism established between China and India during the 2018 meeting between President Xi and Prime Minister Modi—composed of respected former officials, business leaders, and academic experts from both countries who could maintain Track 1.5 dialogue even during periods of diplomatic tension. This more formalized approach, situated between official government communication (Track 1) and purely non-governmental exchanges, would be more aligned with China’s preference for semi-official channels with implicit state backing. This approach, alongside broader subnational connections, would create resilient channels of communication that persist through political cycles and diplomatic crises. Our experience in China-related roles has shown that maintaining such practical engagement channels during difficult periods is essential for long-term strategic interests, as opposed to a complete absence of dialogue, which only reduces Canada’s influence and opportunities.

India Relationship Reset: Acknowledging the complexities of Canada-India relations, we suggest sector-specific initiatives that can withstand periodic bilateral tensions. We recommend building knowledge networks beyond government channels to sustain engagement, with particular focus on critical minerals (responding to India’s newly established National Critical Minerals Mission), clean technology cooperation, food security, and educational partnerships. This targeted approach recognizes India’s strategic importance while working around current diplomatic challenges.

Strategic ASEAN Approach: Rather than treating ASEAN as a monolith, we propose tailored approaches that recognize the diversity within the group. We suggest focusing capacity-building initiatives on Vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia while maintaining broader institutional engagement. Our approach would particularly emphasize cooperation in areas such as climate adaptation, food security, and public health—domains in which Canada has established expertise, and ASEAN has expressed priority needs.

Institutional Architecture: From Presence to Networks

Our proposal fundamentally shifts focus from the IPS emphasis on physical presence to a network-based approach that would deliver greater impact with fewer resources, although care needs to be exercised about any refocus of current initiatives to enhance Canada’s presence given our reputation for constant on-again off-again initiatives in the past. While the original strategy prioritizes establishing offices and expanding diplomatic footprints, we propose specific additional mechanisms absent from the IPS that would particularly strengthen Canada’s capacity to address transnational challenges.

Unlike the IPS’s general references to educational exchange, we call for structured academic partnerships between Canadian and Asian universities with joint research agendas on climate adaptation, food security, public health, and clean energy—leveraging Canadian research strengths in these fields. Establishing specialized networks that connect Canadian expertise in climate science, agricultural research, public health, and water management with Asian counterparts, creating sustained collaboration on shared challenges, should be a priority.

Where the IPS broadly mentions digital cooperation, we recommend creating government-facilitated, purpose-built digital platforms specifically designed for policy dialogue and knowledge exchange, led by university partnerships working on transnational challenges. Cross-sectoral exchange programs, which are not mentioned in the IPS, would create structured opportunities for Canadian officials, business leaders, and academics to work temporarily within Asian institutions, while also hosting Asian counterparts in Canadian organizations. These exchanges would build lasting personal relationships and institutional knowledge that remain valuable even when political leadership changes.

In preparing Canadians for a closer, more comprehensive relationship with Asian partners, our approach moves beyond the IPS’s general acknowledgment of “Asia competence” to propose comprehensive language and cultural competency through specific investments in language training programs, cultural intelligence development, and area studies across Canadian institutions. Unlike the IPS’s broad youth engagement references, we recommend next-generation leadership networks through structured programs that would identify and connect emerging leaders in both Canada and key Asian countries, creating relationships that will sustain engagement for decades. Models worth building on and emulating include the Cansbridge Fellowship, which provides scholarship funding for third year university students to undertake coop programs in Asia.

We can build on existing Canadian strengths in this network-based approach. Canada’s Innovation Superclusters Initiative has already established powerful collaborative networks in areas including digital technology, protein industries, advanced manufacturing, ocean industries, and artificial intelligence. These domestic clusters bring together industry, academia, and government in ways that accelerate innovation and build competitive advantage. Connecting these established Canadian networks with complementary Asian innovation ecosystems through the Global Innovation Clusters would create powerful international partnerships that leverage existing investments. For example, Canada’s Digital Supercluster could establish formal relationships with digital innovation hubs in Singapore, Bangalore, and Seoul, creating pathways for Canadian firms to access Asian markets and expertise while offering Asian partners access to Canadian innovation. Such cluster-to-cluster connections would provide Canadian businesses with established entry points into complex Asian innovation ecosystems while building sustained relationships that transcend individual companies or government initiatives.

This network-centric approach represents a fundamental shift from the infrastructure-focused elements of the original IPS, potentially delivering deeper engagement with greater efficiency while positioning Canada as a valued partner in addressing shared regional challenges.

Coordinated Implementation: A Catalyst-Driven Approach

We recognize the importance of the existing Indo-Pacific Coordination Office within Global Affairs Canada but recommend expanding its mandate and reach to that of an interagency facilitator that would convene and incentivize action across government departments, provincial and territorial governments, academic institutions, and private sector stakeholders. This whole-of-Canada approach would position government as a catalyst and framework-setter rather than the sole driver of initiatives. The expanded office would establish clear metrics for measuring effects, facilitate knowledge-sharing between sectors, and create formal channels for non-federal actors to contribute to Canada’s regional strategy.

Additionally, we propose strategic convening processes that would stimulate collaboration across sectors. Regulatory and diplomatic frameworks that enable public-private initiatives, alongside seed funding mechanisms that incentivize institutional commitments, should be developed. For example, a Canada-ASEAN Regulatory Cooperation Framework could identify and address barriers to digital trade and services, while targeted Export Development Canada financing mechanisms could de-risk initial market entry for Canadian firms in priority Asian markets. Knowledge mobilization initiatives would connect research to policy and business, while public engagement strategies would build broader Canadian understanding of Asia. Concrete examples include establishing an Indo-Pacific Policy Research Network connecting Canadian researchers with policymakers through regular briefings and secondments, and expanding the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s Asia-focused K-12 curriculum modules beyond British Columbia to other Canadian provinces. These mutually reinforcing elements would create a coordinated yet flexible approach to implementation that maximizes impact while respecting the distinct roles of various stakeholders.

A key strength of this proposed approach is that it positions government as a catalyst, coordinator and convenor rather than a subsidizer of initiatives. We recommend strategic government actions—whether financial, regulatory, or diplomatic—that incentivize broader engagement while minimizing direct ongoing expenditures. For example, the federal government, with support from interested provinces, could convene a “Council on Non-Traditional Security Collaboration” that brings together experienced leaders and experts from Canada and key Asian countries. This council would identify shared challenges in areas such as climate resilience, food security, and public health, while recommending practical collaborative initiatives that leverage existing institutional capabilities. Such an approach would establish frameworks for ongoing cooperation without requiring substantial new funding structures.

Adding to, but also shifting the focus from, physical infrastructure to knowledge networks would potentially reduce capital and operational costs while increasing engagement depth. By focusing on priority relationships and sectors, government can provide initial incentives that foster private sector and institutional engagement, creating self-sustaining initiatives over time. In many cases, appropriate regulatory adjustments or diplomatic agreements could enable greater engagement without requiring significant funding.

Many of our proposed academic partnerships, secondment programs, and digital platforms could operate through cost-sharing arrangements with academic institutions, private sector partners, and Asian counterparts once government provides initial convening and framework support. We recommend a staged approach that would begin with initiatives that can leverage existing funding mechanisms while creating momentum for broader engagement. Our proposed enhanced coordination function would include mechanisms to evaluate how effectively government actions have stimulated broader engagement across sectors.

Evolution, Not Revolution

The new Pacific Pathway for Canada that we propose represents an evolution, not a replacement, of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. By pursuing strategic autonomy, focusing on transnational challenges where Canada has established expertise, and positioning government as an enabler, Canada could demonstrate the strategic seriousness that regional partners have long sought.

Our approach would maintain core commitments while adapting to new realities. It recognizes that Asia’s importance to Canadian interests will only grow in coming decades, requiring both immediate tactical adjustments and long-term strategic vision. By emphasizing domains such as climate adaptation, food security, energy security, and public health, Canada can make distinctive contributions that address pressing regional concerns while building meaningful partnerships.

Throughout our careers working across Asia, we have witnessed the evolution of regional dynamics and Canada’s position within them. The recommendations in this paper draw not just from theoretical frameworks but from decades of direct engagement with Asian governments, businesses, and civil society. Most importantly, our approach acknowledges that effective engagement requires both continuity and flexibility—maintaining commitment while adapting to a rapidly changing global environment.

Stewart Beck is the former President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. His diplomatic career included appointments as Canada’s High Commissioner to India, Consul General to Shanghai, and postings in Taiwan.

Hugh Stephens served at Canadian missions in Hong Kong, Beijing, Islamabad and Seoul and was Head of Mission in Taipei. He was SVP Public Policy for Asia Pacific for Time Warner for a decade, based in Hong Kong.