The following is the text of the statement by Sen. Peter M. Boehm, Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, on third reading of Bill C-70, An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference on June 19, 2024.

Honourable senators, I rise to speak to Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act.

Much has been said already but, given the seriousness of the subject matter and its impact on a foundational element of Canadian society – namely our very democracy – I wish to add my voice to this important debate.

The revelations in the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions released recently by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians – also known as NSICOP – were unsettling.

It demonstrates that Canadians, least of all the government and parliamentarians, can no longer sit back and turn a blind eye to interference by foreign states in our democratic processes.

As the report revealed, current and former elected officials have wittingly colluded with foreign governments against Canada’s national interests.

Despite its domination of the news cycle lately, foreign interference against Canada, and other countries, has been a problem for decades.

There has been much debate and frustration over the timing of this bill because, after years of ignoring a clear and present danger, it is both only coming now and is being rushed through Parliament in only a few weeks.

One thing all parliamentarians and Canadians agree on is that Canada needs to finally start taking seriously the significant national security threat of foreign interference.

That is what Bill C-70 aims to do.

It is not perfect – I have yet to see the bill that is – but it is a solid first step in at least addressing foreign interference in our democratic processes, especially as we near the next federal election.

Just as “foreign interference” requires a clear definition, so, too, does understanding how it impacts our democratic processes, and what those processes are beyond elections themselves.

NSICOP’s report cites key processes including:

“the election itself; nomination processes, including leadership races; parliamentary business, including parliamentary motions and the legislative process; campaigns; and fundraising.”

When we talk about foreign interference, especially as parliamentarians, we must recognize that there is much more to a functioning democracy than the specific act of voting.

In understanding how malign foreign actors seek to influence these processes, the NSICOP report states that foreign interference:

“Undermines the democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians; the fairness and openness of Canada’s public institutions; the ability of Canadians to make informed decisions and participate in civic discourse; the integrity and credibility of Canada’s parliamentary process; and public trust in the policy decisions made by the government.”

So, colleagues, we are not just talking about the possibility of one candidate winning over another with the help of a foreign state, which is certainly bad enough.

We are talking about the longstanding, ongoing assault on a fundamental element of our society and the public trust needed to ensure its survival.

Along with the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry and bolstering the ability of CSIS to do its work through amendments to the CSIS Act, as well as increased investment, Bill C-70 is also playing an important role in the public discourse around foreign interference.

Over the more than 11 hours of meeting time last week on the pre-study of Bill C-70 at the National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, we heard that, while there are serious concerns – such as the potential impact on privacy and the right to protest and the rushing through of the bill – there is also general agreement that this legislation is much-needed and long overdue.

One problem, as I see it, is that parliamentarians and their staff are not equipped with the knowledge of how to identify foreign interference efforts.

As parliamentarians, we often meet with ambassadors and high commissioners and other diplomats, as do members of our staff.

That is a normal part of diplomacy and of our roles in this place.

Just as Canadian diplomats abroad work to influence governments and legislators to advance Canada’s national interests and priorities, foreign diplomats accredited to Canada are sent by their countries to try to influence our own policies.

However, there are lines that diplomats do not and cannot cross.

As with most things, there are grey zones, but it is important to recognize the differences between foreign influence and foreign interference.

In my previous life as a foreign service officer for 37 years, especially posted abroad, I engaged with, influenced, and sometimes even cajoled others to advance Canada’s interests.

Regardless of the goals I was trying to achieve, however, I did not cross any lines.

Acceptable diplomatic conduct involves states engaging in open, transparent, and mutually agreed-upon interactions to promote their respective values and national interests, build alliances, and foster international cooperation.

These activities are conducted within the framework of international law and norms under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and its companion, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.

Canada actively influences other countries in various ways.

For example, Canada advocates for ratification of free trade agreements; de-escalation of conflicts and tensions around the world; and advancing Canadian policy objectives and values, including human rights, women’s political empowerment, and LGBTQI+ rights.

Interaction with foreign officials, here in Ottawa and on postings abroad, was a mainstay of my previous life and has continued in my current life.

That is the norm for most, if not all, of us in this room as well as for our staff.

Going beyond normal diplomatic activities in an attempt to subvert a sovereign country’s democracy and society, however, is crossing the line between influence and interference.

That is why being able to recognize the difference is so important.

Unfortunately, there remains a lack of knowledge in this respect.

As much as Bill C-70 will make a difference, it would go that much further if parliamentarians and their staff had the knowledge to empower them to differentiate between foreign influence and interference so they can identify and manage issues.

With all the attention and blandishments we, as parliamentarians, receive from representatives of foreign countries here and on our journeys abroad, it would be in our best interest – and that of our intelligence agencies – to receive detailed briefings.

Whether parliamentarians receive classified or even unclassified briefings, unclassified security briefings, at the very least, should be offered to senators’ staff, as they are also susceptible to influence and interference tactics.

I know that CSIS is willing to provide these briefings. There should also be the possibility of receiving unclassified and specific country briefings as required.

In my previous career, I was frequently a consumer and purveyor of, as well as sometime contributor to, security and intelligence analysis.

I know that knowledge is power, colleagues, and I believe parliamentarians can play a role in helping to combat foreign interference if we are empowered with the tools to do so.

Our country’s business community – especially the Business Council of Canada – has also advocated for CSIS to communicate more specific and tangible information to Canadian companies.

Just as parliamentarians and staff need to understand the growing threat environment, so, too, do business leaders so they can better protect their employees, customers, and communities.

Amendments to the CSIS Act outlined in Bill C-70 will allow CSIS to share more with companies than they are currently permitted.

Efforts are not just underway in Canada to combat foreign interference in our own democratic processes but globally with our partners and allies, too.

Colleagues, foreign interference is not a problem unique to Canada. It is one that impacts every liberal democracy around the world.

While frustrations about Canada’s response to interference against our own country are justified, it is important to understand that Canada is not the only target.

That is why we need to work with our partners and allies around the world to combat the threat we all face.

For example, Canada worked with its G7 partners on a unified approach to countering malign foreign activities at the G7 Summit last week in Italy.

In the G7 Leaders Communiqué released last week at the end of the summit, leaders acknowledged the threat posed by Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, which now has an acronym: FIMI.

G7 Leaders pledged to strengthen their coordinated efforts to better prevent, detect, and respond to foreign interference and will direct their relevant ministers to bolster Charlevoix’s G7 Rapid Response Mechanism by creating, by the end of this year, a collective response framework to counter foreign threats to democracies, including publicly exposing foreign operations of information manipulation.

Domestic and global efforts to combat foreign interference activities are all well and good, but it is crucial that we review measures taken to ensure their efficacy – or lack thereof.

Bill C-70 was amended by the House Committee on Public Safety and National Security to require a comprehensive parliamentary review of this Act and its operation not just, as originally planned, after every five-year period, but also during the first year after a general election.

This is important, colleagues, especially considering the gravity of the threat against our democracy – and the need to see what works and what does not work – as well as the concerns of diaspora communities and civil liberties organizations.

As the Chair of a committee that undertook a mandated five-year comprehensive review of legislation – that being the Sergei Magnitsky Law and the Special Economic Measures Act – I know that legislative reviews do not necessarily happen just because they are written into law.

It is my hope that parliamentarians, and indeed Canadians, can count on the following points:

That, in the context of the operation of the Act in the case of a post-election review, the designated Senate or House committee be required to identify any cases of interference that might have occurred and how they were dealt with and that members of that committee receive any necessary intelligence briefings and security clearances; and that reports be written in a way that is accessible to the Canadian public, which deserves transparency, especially in matters impacting the functioning of our foundational democratic processes.

Finally, we need a clear understanding of how the success – or failure – of the Act and its operation will be measured beyond waiting to see what happens at the next election.

The Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs can play an important role in looking at the implementation of C-70 beyond the mandatory reviews, particularly regarding its impact on diaspora communities and civil liberties organizations.

Colleagues, foreign interference must not be subject to hyper-partisanship as we have all agreed that it is a matter of grave and enduring importance.

It also requires creative and modern solutions capable of adapting to constantly developing threats and tactics.

Unfortunately, Canada has long been complacent when it comes to national security.

Even 100 years ago, former Quebec Senator Raoul Dandurand told the League of Nations that Canadians “live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”

Despite wars and conflicts around the world, terrorist attacks, cyberattacks, and the many humanitarian crises over the past century, Canada has not abandoned its sense of invulnerability.

Bill C-70 is long overdue, colleagues, but it is perhaps finally an acknowledgement that Canada is not invincible and that we, ultimately, are responsible for the security of our own country.

Without safeguarding the heart of our society – our very democracy – there will be no country to defend.

Thank you.