The following is an abridged version of the chapter contributed by Sen. Peter M Boehm, Policy contributor and chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to Democracy and Foreign Policy in an Era of Uncertainty, the latest Canada Among Nations international relations anthology, published by Palgrave Macmillan (2023).

By Peter M. Boehm

May 28, 2024

There is a narrative on social media, among the far right and the far left, fuelled by various conspiracy theories, that democracy – particularly in those countries rated high on democratic indicators by Freedom House, IDEA and other non-governmental organizations that rate democratic observance in governance and human rights terms – is in peril.

These views were clearly expressed by the “Freedom Convoy” which occupied downtown Ottawa in January and February of 2022, whose basic tenets were opposition to Covid-19 vaccination policies and the view that governmental actions, chiefly at the federal level, transgressed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It was beyond ironic for me that a manifesto circulated by the occupiers called upon the unelected Senate of Canada, working with the unelected Governor General, to overthrow the elected government.

While there is a history in Canada of peaceful and not-so-peaceful protest against perceived government overreach: the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919, the “on to Ottawa trek” and the Regina riot of 1935 during the great depression, anti-conscription riots, international summit protests, this was the first occasion of a prolonged multi-venue massive protest that featured on-line organization and execution. Moreover, the federal government invoked the Emergencies Act on February 14^th 2022 for the first time to deal with the Ottawa occupation and border paralysis in Windsor, Ontario and Coutts, Alberta.

Polling indicated that many Canadians exhibited a more centrist view and did not approve of the demonstrators’ actions. Some politicians sought to exploit the crisis for political gain. Social media provided a multiplier effect in terms of both misinformation and disinformation, the latter apparently also pushed by some malign state actors. While Covid-19 vaccination mandates may have proven to be the catalyst, it was also evident, not just in Canada but in other countries with perceived unshakeable democracies, that the pandemic, restrictions on individuals’ movement outside of Canada, rising prices, pressures on supply chains and among some a decreasing faith in democratic institutions, had contributed to the malaise.

This was a global phenomenon, not just confined to Canada, although the form of its expression here (ie occupation by truck), given our relatively peaceful domestic history, generated much attention. The debate about whether and by whom democracy was usurped in our country will continue for some time, certainly on social media. But it comes down to facts versus feelings: the government acted lawfully in imposing both vaccine mandates and reacting with the Emergencies Act. The Rouleau Commission of Enquiry eventually concluded that the threshold required for the federal government to invoke the Emergencies Act had been met.

Debates in the House of Commons on the introduction of the Emergencies Act were both desultory and laden with histrionics; in the Senate, over two days of debate on February 22 and 23, 36 senators spoke to the motion to confirm the Emergencies Act before its invocation was revoked and the motion withdrawn (In January, 2024, a Federal Court ruling deemed the use of the Emergencies Act unconstitutional. The federal government is appealing that ruling). A public inquiry (mandated under the Act) and a joint parliamentary committee (also mandated under the Act but really only for the duration of the imposition of it) were convened. The fact that these reporting and accountability measures are included in the legislation does underscore fundamental democratic principles.

It would be incredibly premature and inaccurate to suggest that Canadian democracy is at great risk by either the occupation of the centre of our country’s capital or the response. Nonetheless, some of the underlying ideas and overarching goals of the organizers indeed suggest a great and insidious risk to democracy. Perhaps better cases could be made that the invocation of the “notwithstanding clause” (Section 33 of the Constitution) by some provinces as a heavy measure to quash any opposition to new legislation or the introduction of provincial legislation that would allow choice in accepting federal legislation, constitute more of a threat to the pillars of our Constitution. Some might even ask whether Canada should be promoting democratic development abroad when it should really get its own house in order, reconciliation with its indigenous peoples being a prime example.

We have learned in our own adaptation of the Westminster system that our democracy has moved along incrementally, from Confederation in 1867, to the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the passage of Canadian Citizenship Act of 1947, to the “repatriation” of our Constitution in 1982. Any effort to exact constitutional change in Canada is complex. What is required for an amendment to pass regarding both the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting senators is the general amending procedure (section 38.1):  the agreement of a minimum of two thirds of the provinces representing at least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces in addition to the consent of both the Senate and the House of Commons.

Canada’s parliament can boast of eight multilateral and five bilateral parliamentary associations, four inter-parliamentary groups and approximately 60 friendship groups.

The changes to the Senate appointments process were developed by the current government in 2016, upending a process that had been in effect since 1867. It probably represents the furthest the government could go without crossing the line into formal constitutional change. To the extent that Canadians care about these changes, polls have indicated support for the reforms but those who also think abolishing the institution might be worth considering have not gone away. From 2015 to 2019, one third of government bills were successfully amended in the Senate, as opposed to work under the previous appointments system when only one out of 61 bills was amended between 2013 to 2015. Time will decide whether our parliamentary system has become more democratic through these reforms.

Also, despite the restrictions over two years imposed by the pandemic in terms of requirements for virtual, hybrid and a reduced number of hearings by Senate committees, reports and studies have still been produced. In addition, two studies currently underway, one on security in the Arctic undertaken by the Senate Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs, and a study on the “fit for purpose” nature of Global Affairs Canada undertaken by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, potentially represent significant contributions to public policy, assuming the government heeds the recommendations in some measure.

The evolution of our upper house continues along its own path, but it is interesting how some countries with a similar heritage have changed their upper houses going from outright abolition (New Zealand) to proportional representation elections and fixed terms (Australia) to the ongoing struggles in the British parliament on reforming the House of Lords in terms of size (currently 784) crossbench/independent members, terms and accountability. Should a future Canadian government wish to return to the status quo ante in terms of Senate appointments, any change involving a return to traditional partisan political appointments would, given current demographics in the chamber, take a generation to be palpable.

Apart from the often-valuable committee work undertaken in both houses of parliament, expressions to support democracy or criticize the lack thereof tend to take the form of motions. Motions may have symbolic value in terms of signalling the will of parliament for the government or a foreign state to undertake certain commitments. They can be unanimous, contested through votes, but inevitably fulfill the purpose of quick gratification, sometimes reflecting a politically partisan or diaspora-infused position (sometimes for political gain, given Canada’s very diverse electorate). They are often wide of the mark in terms of the feasibility of the implementation of their demands. At the end of the day, the government will take its international positions under the Royal Prerogative, regardless of the wishes or demands expressed through parliamentary motions.

A different approach is the promotion of democracy through the work of inter-parliamentary groups and associations across the globe. Canada’s parliament can boast of eight multilateral and five bilateral parliamentary associations, four inter-parliamentary groups and approximately 60 friendship groups. The longest standing entity is the Inter-Parliamentary Union, founded in 1889, which under its motto, “For Democracy, For Everyone” brings together some 178 parliaments, including many from dictatorships. While meetings of all groups were either curtailed or undertaken virtually during the pandemic, the value of interaction, exchange of best legislative practices and discussion of themes ranging from security, human rights, gender to bilateral and regional issues cannot be underestimated.

Canadian efforts to support democracy around the world have been determined and well-intentioned over the past few decades, regardless of who was in power in Ottawa. We are a middle power that can, if it wishes, kick consistently on the democracy file.

Canadian groups are comprised of both members of parliament and senators and overall management falls under the umbrella of the Joint Interparliamentary Council. In my view, greater attention should be given to targeted funding and cohesion amongst these groups and with a clearer enunciation of the Canadian national interest, in supporting democratic development, for example. Substantive preparation is vital to the credibility of these groups as they meet with their counterparts. If not, we will come across as well-intentioned but parochial when interacting with our foreign counterparts, either in Canada or abroad. My bias is clear: Canada is one of the world’s oldest and most durable democracies. We should look at greater parliamentary engagement abroad, with the hope that some of our “political osmosis” might have an impact on legislators in other jurisdictions. All should recognize that the process of what will be a lengthy period of reconciliation with our indigenous peoples, as painful as it is and will be, is a sign of democratic maturity.

The promotion of democracy remains an important tenet of Canadian foreign, trade and international development policies. The past few years have featured a greater correlation between international development and democratic governance goals through the amalgamation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) into the then Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2013. While the bureaucratic culture has been slow to change, particularly with respect to project management, the advent of the Feminist International Assistance Policy in 2017 provided opportunity for greater emphasis on more agile definition of local requirements and targeted expenditures.

However, the evolution continues: the recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy features democratic development as a pillar, and one to be included in discussions with authoritarian governments in the region. The speech by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland at the Brookings Institute in November of 2022 made references to “friendshoring”, in the context that global actions by authoritarian actors, Russia and China in particular, should be countered by efforts among like-minded countries to pool resources and act on the basis of shared democratic values (Buck, Manulak 2022). The chapter on how such an approach could lead to either strengthening or changing the international rules-based order has yet to be written.

That order was more or less established in 1945 on a statist, multilateral framework. Since then, globalization and the technological revolution that has brought us the internet and, with it, social media, has given more scope for civil society interaction, for good or ill, including in autocracies. The rapid Chinese policy changes in pandemic management and Russian men voting with their feet to avoid conscription serve as examples. Iron curtains and lines of control have been relegated to the past, despite efforts to control access to the world wide web through outright system control or the spreading of misinformation and disinformation through troll and bot farms. So, new or revised forms of democratic interaction among the “likeminded” should not ignore the value of maintaining if not enhancing people-to-people contact.

Canadian efforts to support democracy around the world have been determined and well-intentioned over the past few decades, regardless of who was in power in Ottawa. We are a middle power that can, if it wishes, kick consistently on the democracy file. Our efforts through international organizations such as the Commonwealth and the OAS have had some lasting impact, regardless of current challenges. Our work on electoral reform, observation and strengthening parliamentary institutions, promoting gender equality, space for diverse voices is probably without peer. We have successfully pressed for consensus (the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter) and demonstrated creativity in establishing and chairing a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism launched by leaders in Charlevoix in 2018 that promotes coordinated responses to evolving threats to democracy (Boehm 2019). But the challenges are huge.

The economic impact of the pandemic has resulted in some countries slipping back from their “emerging economy” status to qualify again for official development assistance. This against a backdrop of food insecurity, more displaced people and climatic disasters. These are often interrelated factors. Other international actors have stepped in to offer cheap credit, infrastructure development and/or mercenary forces to struggling countries. It is more than time for richer democracies to up their game, to redefine assistance for democratic development, coordinate better and increase funding.

Given its record, Canada is well-placed to initiate and to lead. But the will among all political actors must be mustered to address this unprecedented challenge. And that is not an easy task.

Policy contributing writer Sen. Peter Boehm is the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He is also a former ambassador and deputy minister who served as sherpa for six G7 summits.