As an array of systemic competition narratives plays out across strategic arenas from Ukraine to post-pandemic supply chains to political influence contests in Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and beyond, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) researcher Zachary Paikin argues that Canada needs to re-assess its foreign policy.

Zachary Paikin

The tenth anniversary of Policy magazine presents an opportunity to reflect on how the world has changed over the past decade, along with Canada’s place in it. Nearly 10 full years ago, in November 2013, crowds began to gather on the Maidan in Kyiv to oppose the decision of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych not to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, opting instead to deepen ties with the Russian-backed Eurasian Economic Union.

Not long thereafter, Yanukovych was toppled. Russia proceeded to annex Crimea and began its meddling in the Donbas. Hopes of building some sort of “common space” from Lisbon to Vladivostok, nominally shared throughout the post-Cold War era and already on life support, were dashed. An important turning point in history had been reached: Russia no longer sought to define its pursuit of great power status by pursuing some kind of partnership with the West, but rather by opposing it. The stage was set for the emergence of a multipolar world.

In recent decades, Canada has been mostly content to view its foreign policy through a values-based lens. This reflected its own national identity and was facilitated by the proximity of a liberal-minded, global hegemonic power in the form of the United States. But the advent of a multipolar world implies that other centres of power now exist that are able – and willing – to resist the influence, values and preferences of Western countries. The terms of international order are no longer ours alone to set.

The new global context calls for a Canadian foreign policy that is comfortable speaking the language of interests, rather than just values. Yet it remains far from clear whether Canadians are prepared to make this necessary – perhaps vital – psychological leap.

Previous generations of Canadians with a sense of their country’s foreign policy often frame it through the lens of Canada’s “role in the world”. For them, foreign policy is less about national interests than it is about national identity – or at least these two things are thought to be synonymous.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ill-conceived invasion of Ukraine last February has raised doubts over whether his country remains a great power. Ukrainian battlefield successes have re-energized the West’s unity and sense of purpose. However, these facts have not prevented multipolarity from remaining an emerging trend at the global level.

For example, many countries in the so-called Indo-Pacific region have refused to pick sides in the deepening US-China rivalry. While they may view Beijing’s rise with a degree of apprehension, and therefore welcome a greater Western security presence in their region, favouring Western engagement should not be confused with deferring entirely to Western leadership.

Situated closer to China than we are, local actors in the “Indo-Pacific” are clear-eyed about Beijing’s intentions and do not need to be warned about its predatory behaviour. Despite their misgivings, they have a nuanced understanding of their own interests. Many cannot ignore that China remains the lifeblood of their economies and, as such, do not wish for an extra-regional power like the US to exacerbate tensions needlessly by bisecting the region along ideological lines. Such a dynamic would undermine the inclusive and integrated regional order underpinning decades of Asian peace.

Similarly, a large majority of countries represented at the United Nations has condemned Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. However, most of the world – including leading democracies such as India and Brazil – has not joined the Western-led sanctions campaign against Russia. Many of these countries may disagree with Russia’s actions but see little apparent benefit in severing diplomatic and economic relations with it.

Unprovoked aggression against a sovereign state is one of the cardinal sins of today’s international order. The inability to rally a sizeable coalition to oppose Russia’s blatantly illegal act shows how the West’s chosen narrative – embracing a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism as the new core dynamic of international relations – does not hold global currency. In fact, it is no accident that this binary worldview lacks international support, as there is an inherent tension between the Western understanding of the “liberal international order” and the realities of a multipolar world.

Previous generations of Canadians with a sense of their country’s foreign policy often frame it through the lens of Canada’s “role in the world”. For them, foreign policy is less about national interests than it is about national identity – or at least these two things are thought to be synonymous.

A change of the generational guard may not necessarily engender a change in national sensibilities on these questions. Engrained narratives are reproduced across generations and can thus be hard to shake. But failure to choose also represents a choice: a continued decline into international irrelevance.

Such an approach may have worked in previous historical eras. For much of the Cold War, as a leading member of one of just two international power blocs, Canada could carve out a role as an “honest broker” and defender of multilateralism amidst a superpower standoff. In the unipolar era that followed, the world seemed ripe for Canadian engagement based on liberal values. The period of unrivalled American power allowed for the expansion of a Western-backed “liberal international order” which went beyond mere rules-based cooperation between states, toward a project of global transformation rooted in liberal democracy and the market.

The rise of rival powers, combined with Western missteps such as the Iraq War and the Great Recession, has rendered increasingly implausible the vision of a global order based on liberal values and Western hegemony. But while the “liberal international order” may have declined over recent years, Canada’s relative influence in global affairs has waned even more markedly.

Canada’s shrunken global profile owes itself partly to freeriding and neglect, the country’s last foreign policy review having taken place nearly two decades ago. But it is mostly the result of structural factors. With the world no longer divided into capitalist and communist blocs, Canada now finds itself positioned in a terrain of global scope in which the West’s share of global GDP is in relative decline. And geographic isolation, combined with a mostly reactive approach to foreign policy, mean that Ottawa is not a key player in either European or Asian security dynamics – two theatres where much of the future of global order will be written.

The failure to craft a global liberal order coinciding with the advent of multipolarity suggests that we now inhabit, at least in certain respects, a post-liberal order. In such an order, a Canadian foreign policy rooted in values-centric megaphone diplomacy is a recipe for isolation rather than influence. And confident assertions of our supposed “role in the world” cannot hide the fact that we are no longer a middle power.

In an international order where liberalism no longer holds a monopoly on conceptions of modernity or universality, albeit one still undergoing a transition whose endpoint remains uncertain, the task for the next generation of Canadian foreign policy thinkers will be twofold. First, can Canada genuinely learn to think about its international engagement through the lens of interests rather than mostly values? And second, can it reach a consensus understanding of the geographic reach and thematic scope of its national interests beyond its borders?

Given Canada’s reduced international stature, the aforementioned questions may tilt toward encouraging acceptance of a foreign policy of reduced – albeit more targeted – scope. Highlighting the need to preserve the “rules-based international order”, although a laudable and necessary aim, glosses over the crucial and more fundamental question of what truly remains a core national interest in a world where the rules are already being litigated among the great powers. And with middle power status gone for the foreseeable future, likely gone with it are the hopes of being a decisive force in shaping global governance and regional order-building, even if certain forms of niche engagement can be periodically carved out.

On the one hand, Canadians could embrace the notion of having a smaller global footprint. A strategy focused on securing core national interests could be easier to sell than some vague and grandiose idea that “the world needs more Canada”. On the other hand, deciding what is – and, perhaps more importantly, what is not – a core national interest also means confronting idealists and ethnocultural groups with harsh truths. Challenging an engrained sense of national identity may not be a vote getter.

A change of the generational guard may not necessarily engender a change in national sensibilities on these questions. Engrained narratives are reproduced across generations and can thus be hard to shake. But failure to choose also represents a choice: a continued decline into international irrelevance, albeit without being compensated with the benefits of a more clearly defined and limited policy focus. If Canada continues to spread itself thin on the world stage, this lends itself by default to a national foreign policy whose terms are set by the United States.

If there is one engrained narrative that animates a sizeable proportion of Canadians, it is the need to preserve a semblance of autonomy from our southern neighbour. To the extent that Canadians care about foreign policy, it may ironically be a longstanding habit that one day creates the conditions for a national rethink – one aimed at arresting decades of intellectual inertia and policy drift.

Dr. Zachary Paikin is a researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. He is also a non-resident research fellow with the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy, a North American foreign policy think tank with a presence in Toronto, Ottawa and Washington, DC. He is co-editor (with Trine Flockhart) of the recent volume Rebooting Global International Society: Change, Contestation and Resilience, published by Palgrave Macmillan (2022).